Making sense of the conflicting narratives about China’s economic and political aspirations.

Astonishingly tone-deaf and factually questionable: “China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man … they can’t even figure out how to deal with the fact that they have this great division between the China Sea and the mountains … in the west. They can’t figure out how they’re going to deal with the corruption that exists within the system. I mean, you know, they’re not bad folks, folks. But guess what? They’re not competition for us.” (Former Vice President Joe Biden, May 1, 2019)

In recent months, we’ve been hearing a wide range of views about China’s economic and political aspirations and their potential implications for the United States.

Some of the opinions being expressed seem to be polar opposites — such as President Donald Trump’s pronouncements that the United States has been “ripped off” by China for decades.  Contrast this with former Vice President Joe Biden’s dismissive contention that China represents no competition for the United States at all.

Several days ago, the political commentator Dick Morris published an op-ed piece in the Western Journal in which he seems to be nearly 100% “all-in” with the alarmists.

The column is titled Trump Is Waging (and Winning) a Peaceful World War III Against China.  My curiosity aroused, I decided to get in touch with my brother, Nelson Nones, who has lived and worked in the Far East for the past 20+ years. Being an American “on the ground” in countries like China, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia gives Nelson an interesting perspective from which to be a “reality check” on the views we’re hearing locally.

I sent Nelson a link to the Morris op-ed and asked for his reaction. Here is what he communicated back to me: 

I think Dick Morris is correct to contend that the Chinese government’s long-term vision is bigger than just accumulating more wealth and power. In fact, I wrote about this topic in the book I co-authored with Janson Yap, when describing China’s “Belt and Road” initiatives as a geographic positioning threat to Singapore.

 I wrote:  

“As a land-based strategy, the SREB [Silk Road Economic Belt] promises greater long-term rewards for China than the MSR [Maritime Silk Road]; these would echo the impact of the completion of the first transcontinental railroad in 1869, which marked the beginning of the ascendancy of the U.S. to becoming one of the preeminent economic empires of all time.”

 The context here is, if you look back through history, the world’s most dominant economic empires were either terrestrial or maritime — but not both — until the U.S. came along. As I further wrote in the book:

“After gaining control over both strategic land and maritime trade routes with the completion of the Panama Canal in 1913, America became the first land-based and maritime economic empire in history; its dominance has spanned over a century, from 1916 to the present. Uncoincidentally, the American economic empire began when the Panama Canal was completed, but the Panama Canal has arguably contributed far less to America’s GDP than the country’s investments in transcontinental rail and road transportation infrastructure.” 

In short, I am absolutely sure China’s government aspires to overtake the U.S. as the world’s dominant terrestrial and maritime economic empire, and to hold that position for at least a century if not longer. But this would not be the first time in history that China has held such a position. 

For the historical context, refer to: http://fortune.com/2014/10/05/most-powerful-economic-empires-of-all-time/. There you will see that the U.S. produced half the world’s economic output in circa 1950. China’s Song Dynasty was the world’s preeminent economic empire in circa 1200 AD, producing 25% to 30% of global output. Only the U.S. and the Roman Empire have ever matched or exceeded that marker. 

I can tell you from my considerable experience on the ground in China that the strategic vision of its leaders is grounded in much more than just backward-looking grievance and necessity. Although the 19th Century Opium Wars (which were fought during the Qing Dynasty against the British Empire, and occurred during the period of the British Empire’s economic ascendancy) are often trotted out in China’s government-controlled English language dailies, the Chinese people I know have little or no knowledge of the Opium Wars or the colonial victimization China allegedly suffered a century and a half ago.  

But they are acutely aware, and genuinely proud, of China’s emergence as a leading economic powerhouse; and this is how the Chinese government maintains its legitimacy.   

China’s ambitions, in other words, have much more to do with reinstating its former glory (the Song Dynasty economic empire) than with righting wrongs (dominance by colonial powers), and are fundamental props for maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power. 

This view renders many of Dick Morris’ comments unnecessarily hyperbolic; for example “[China’s] goal is to reduce the rest of the world to colonial or dominion status, controlled politically, socially, intellectually, and economically by China. In turn, China is run by a handful of men in Beijing who need not pay the slightest attention to the views of those they govern or the nations they dominate.”  

No, China’s goal is to become the world’s dominant economic empire but, just as the Americans before them, they don’t have to exert the same degree of control over the rest of the world as they do within their own territory to achieve this goal.  

And no, they require constant support from the Chinese population to achieve this goal, even though they run an authoritarian state. Why else would they devote so many resources to the “Great Chinese Firewall” if there is no need to “pay the slightest attention to the views of those they govern”? 

Yes, Trump’s trade war with China is important but his motive is to reverse the flow of jobs and capital out of the U.S. to China, which is not the same thing as launching an “economic World War III.” At a more practical and mundane level, it’s to fulfil a pile of campaign promises which Trump made when he was running for President, and to secure the loyalty of his base. 

_______________________________

So there you have it: the perspectives of someone “on the scene” in the Far East — holding a view that is more nuanced than the hyperbole of the alarmists, but also clear-eyed and miles apart from the head-in-the-sand naiveté of other politicians like Joe Biden.

Let’s also hope for a more meaningful and reality-based discourse on the topic of China in the coming months and years.

China-bashing is taking its toll.

Over the past year, Americans have been fed a fairly steady stream of news about the People’s Republic of China – and most of it hasn’t been particularly positive.

While Russia may get the more fevered news headlines because of the various political investigations happening in Washington, the current U.S. presidential administration hasn’t shied away from criticizing China on a range woes – trade policy in particular most recently, but also diverse other issues like alleged unfair technology transfer policies, plus the building of man-made islands in the South China Sea thereby bringing Chinese military power closer to other countries in the Pacific Rim.

The drumbeat of criticism could be expected to affect popular opinion about China – and that appears to be the case based on a just-published report from the Pew Research Center.

The Pew report is based on a survey of 1,500 American adults age 18 and over, conducted during the spring of 2018.  It’s a survey that’s been conducted annually since 2012 using the same set of questions (and going back annually to 2005 for a smaller group of the questions).

The newest study shows that the opinions Americans have about China have become somewhat less positive over the past year, after having nudged higher in 2017.

The topline finding is this: today, ~38% of Americans have a favorable opinion of China, which is a drop of six percentage points from Pew’s 2017 finding of ~44%.  We are now flirting with the same favorability levels that Pew was finding during the 2013-2016 period [see the chart above].

Drilling down further, the most significant concerns pertain to China’s economic competition, not its military strength. In addition to trade and tariff concerns, another area of growing concern is about the threat of cyber-attacks from China.

There are also the perennial concerns about the amount of U.S. debt held by China, as well as job losses to China; this has been a leading issue in the Pew surveys dating back to 2012. But even though debt levels remain a top concern, its raw score has fallen pretty dramatically over the past six years.

On the other hand, a substantial and growing percentage of Americans expresses worries about the impact of China’s growth on the quality of the global environment.

Interestingly, the proportion of Americans who consider China’s military prowess to be a bigger threat compared to an economic threat has dropped by a statistically significant seven percentage points over the past year – from 36% to 29%. Perhaps unsurprisingly, younger Americans age 18-29 are far less prone to have concerns over China’s purported saber-rattling – differing significantly from how senior-age respondents feel on this topic.

Taken as a group, eight issues presented by Pew Research in its survey revealed the following ranking of factors, based on whether respondents consider them to be “a serious problem for the United States”:

  • Large U.S. debt held by China: ~62% of respondents consider a “serious problem”
  • Cyber-attacks launched from China: ~57%
  • Loss of jobs to China: ~52%
  • China’s impact on the global environment: ~49%
  • Human rights issues:  ~49%
  • The U.S. trade deficit with China: ~46%
  • Chinese territorial disputes with neighboring countries: ~32%
  • Tensions between China and Taiwan: ~21%

Notice that the U.S. trade deficit isn’t near the top of the list … but Pew does find that it is rising as a concern.

If the current trajectory of tit-for-tat tariff impositions continues to occur, I suspect we’ll see the trade issue being viewed by the public as a more significant problem when Pew administers its next annual survey one year from now.

Furthermore, now that the United States has just concluded negotiations with Canada and Mexico on a “new NAFTA” agreement, coupled with recent trade agreements made with South Korea and the EU countries, it makes the administration’s target on China as “the last domino” just that much more significant.

More detailed findings from the Pew Research survey can be viewed here.

Where Robots Are Getting Ready to Run the Show

The Brookings Institution has just published a fascinating map that tells us a good deal about what is happening with American manufacturing today.

Headlined “Where the Robots Are,” the map graphically illustrates that as of 2015, nearly one-third of America’s 233,000+ industrial robots are being put to use in just three states:

  • Michigan: ~12% of all industrial robots working in the United States
  • Ohio: ~9%
  • Indiana: ~8%

It isn’t surprising that these three states correlate with the historic heart of the automotive industry in America.

Not coincidentally, those same states also registered a massive lurch towards the political part of the candidate in the 2016 U.S. presidential election who spoke most vociferously about the loss of American manufacturing jobs.

The Brookings map, which plots industrial robot density per 1,000 workers, shows that robots are being used throughout the country, but that the Great Lakes Region is home to the highest density of them.

Toledo, OH has the honor of being the “Top 100” metro area with the highest distribution of industrial robots: nine per 1,000 workers.  To make it to the top of the list, Toledo’s robot volume jumped from around 700 units in 2010 to nearly 2,400 in 2015, representing an average increase of nearly 30% each year.

For the record, here are the Top 10 metropolitan markets among the 100 largest, ranked in terms of their industrial robot exposure.  They’re mid-continent markets all:

  • Toledo, OH: 9.0 industrial robots per 1,000 workers
  • Detroit, MI: 8.5
  • Grand Rapids, MI: 6.3
  • Louisville, KY: 5.1
  • Nashville, TN: 4.8
  • Youngstown-Warren, OH: 4.5
  • Jackson, MS: 4.3
  • Greenville, SC: 4.2
  • Ogden, UT: 4.2
  • Knoxville, TN: 3.7

In terms of where industrial robots are very low to practically non-existent within the largest American metropolitan markets, look to the coasts:

  • Ft. Myers, FL: 0.2 industrial robots per 1,000 workers
  • Honolulu, HI: 0.2
  • Las Vegas, NV: 0.2
  • Washington, DC: 0.3
  • Jacksonville, FL: 0.4
  • Miami, FL: 0.4
  • Richmond, VA: 0.4
  • New Orleans, LA: 0.5
  • New York, NY: 0.5
  • Orlando, FL: 0.5

When one consider that the automotive industry is the biggest user of industrial robots – the International Federation of Robotics estimates that the industry accounts for nearly 40% of all industrial robots in use worldwide – it’s obvious how the Midwest region could end up being the epicenter of robotic manufacturing activity in the United States.

It should come as no surprise, either, that investments in robots are continuing to grow. The Boston Consulting Group has concluded that a robot typically costs only about one-third as much to “employ” as a human worker who is doing the same job tasks.

In another decade or so, the cost disparity will likely be much greater.

On the other hand, two MIT economists maintain that the impact of industrial robots on the volume of available jobs isn’t nearly as dire as many people might think. According to Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo:

“Indicators of automation (non-robot IT investment) are positively correlated or neutral with regard to employment. So even if robots displace some jobs in a given commuting zone, other automation (which presumably dwarfs robot automation in the scale of investment) creates many more jobs.”

What do you think? Are Messrs. Acemoglu and Restrepo on point here – or are they off by miles?  Please share your thoughts with other readers.

Limp Fries: Restaurants Join Brick-and-Mortar Retailing in Facing Economic Challenges

Press reports about the state of the retail industry have focused quite naturally on the travails of the retail segment, chronicling high-profile bankruptcies (most recently hhgregg) along with store closings by such big names as Macy’s, Sears, and even Target.

Less covered, but just as challenging, is the restaurant environment, where a number of high-profile chains have suffered over the past year, along with a general malaise experienced by the industry across-the-board.

This has now been quantified in a benchmarking report issued last month by accounting and business consulting firm BDO USA covering the operating results of publicly traded restaurants in 2016.

The BDO report found that same-store sales were flat overall, with many restaurants facing lower traffic counts.

The “fast casual” segment, which had experienced robust growth in 2015, experienced the largest loss of any restaurant segment in same-store sales in 2016 (nearly 1.5%), along with the highest cost of sales (nearly 31%).

Chipotle’s poor showing, thanks to persistent food contamination problems, didn’t help the category at all, but those results were counterbalanced by several other establishments which beat the category averages significantly (Shake Shack, Wingstop and Panera Bread).

The “casual dining” segment didn’t perform much better, with same-store sales declining nearly 1% over the year. By contrast, “upscale casual” restaurants reported an ever-so-slight same-store sales gain of 0.2%.

Better sales increases were charted at quick serve (fast food) restaurants, with same-store increases of nearly 1%. Even better results were experienced at pizza restaurants, where same-store sales were up nearly 5%.  This category was led by Domino’s with over 10% same-store sales growth, thanks in part to its Tweet-To-Order rollout and other digital innovations.  Well more than half of the Domino’s orders now come through digital channels.

What are some of the broader currents contributing to the mediocre performance of restaurant chains? Unlike retailing, where it’s easy to see how purchasing practices are migrating online from physical stores, people can hardly eat digitally.  And with “time” at an all-time premium in an economy that’s no longer in recession, it would seem that preparing meals at home hasn’t suddenly becoming easier.

The BDO analysis contends that the convenience economy and the continued attractive savings offered by dining at home combine to slow restaurant foot traffic: “To remain afloat, restaurants will need to drive sales by leveraging the very trends that are shaping this evolving consumer behaviors.”

Tactics cited by BDO as lucrative steps for restaurants include expanding delivery options, and embracing digital channels in a major way.  BDO reports that in 2016, digital food ordering accounted for nearly 2 billion restaurant transactions, and this figure is expected to continue to rise significantly.

Speaking personally, I think there is a glut of dining options presented to consumers across the various segments of the restaurant trade. One local example:  In one stretch of highway on the outskirts of a county seat just 20 miles from where I live (population ~20,000), no fewer than six national chain restaurant locations have opened up in the past 24 months strung out along the main highway, joining several others in a string of options like exhibit booths at a trade show

There’s no way that market demand can satisfy the new restaurant capacity in that town.  Something’s gotta give.

What are your thoughts about which chains are doing things right in the highly competitive restaurant environment today – and which ones are stumbling?

Trends in Economic Well-Being in the Era of Globalization

Some findings are surprising …

egThe political environment in the United States and Europe has been an endless source of fascination this year — and of course it’s been influenced by a myriad of factors.

To try to make sense of it all, how much of what is happening is due to new challenges to the social order … and how much is due to changes in economic well-being in an era of globalization?

My brother, Nelson Nones, has lived and worked outside the United States for the past two decades. His business is based in East Asia, and much of his work is done in Europe as well as in Asia and North America.  I find his perspectives quite interesting and often different from the “conventional wisdom” heard here at home, because Nelson’s is truly a worldview borne of first-hand experience and observations across many regions.

I asked Nelson to share his thoughts on how globalization has affected the average person — hopefully looking beyond “perceptions” and other qualitative factors and instead focusing on hard metrics.  Nelson’s analysis is insightful — and surprising in some respects. Here is what he reported:

The “Era of Globalization” covers the last quarter-century, beginning with the fall of Communism and continuing to the present day. It began with the opening of national economies which were previously barred from global trade and migration – the former Soviet Union, Mainland China, India, Brazil and others.

Major economic blocs also emerged to liberalize free trade and migration, most notably the Euro Area but also NAFTA in North America, and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.  

In five of the world’s eight major regions, economic well-being has trended quite consistently during this time.

In North America (the United States, Mexico and Canada) and the Euro Area, economic well-being initially grew but peaked between 1999 (North America) and 2001 (Euro Area), and has declined ever since.  North America’s well-being has fallen 22% since its peak; the Euro Area’s has fallen 20%.

By contrast, economic well-being in the East Asia and Pacific as well as South Asia regions has grown steadily.  It has risen by 74% over the past quarter century in the East Asia and Pacific region, and by 68% in the South Asia region.

Economic well-being in Central Europe and the Baltics has also risen steadily after 1992, up 45% within the past 23 years.

In the remaining three regions, trends in economic well-being have been less consistent. The Middle East and North Africa declined steadily after its 2009 peak; down 7% during the last six years, and down 10% over the entire 25-year period.

The Latin America and Caribbean region peaked in 1994, and is down 15% over the past 21 years.

Bringing up the rear is the Sub-Saharan Africa region, which is down 20% over 25 years, although economic well-being grew marginally during nine of those 25 years.

Interestingly, the trend in economic well-being has been least consistent in the Russian Federation.  It fell 49% between 1990 and 1998, rose 118% between 1999 and 2008, and then fell 5% during the last seven years.  Overall, economic well-being in the Russian Federation rose 7% over the last 25 years.

Here’s a graphical representation of the trends noted above:

Chart Nelson Nones

In very broad terms, what do these trends tell me? 

The hands-down winners during the Era of Globalization have been the East Asia and Pacific (including China, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand), Central Europe and the Baltics, and South Asia (primarily India) regions.

Not surprisingly, these regions (despite a few exceptions, like Pakistan) are generally peaceful and orderly today, abetted by the rule of authoritarian governments in many countries.

Although they profited during the first decade or so, the biggest losers during the Era of Globalization have been the North America and Euro Area regions.  

One could reasonably argue that the UK’s recent Brexit vote, rising far-right sentiments in Western Europe and the popularity of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the current U.S. Presidential election cycle are all recent symptoms of this underlying trend.

One could just as reasonably argue that the oil curse, authoritarianism, widespread unemployment (or underemployment), the rise of radical Islam, war and terrorism are symptoms of the persistent declines in economic well-being throughout the Middle East and North Africa during the Era of Globalization.

Nevertheless, the Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Latin America and Caribbean regions have underperformed even the Middle East and North Africa region during the Era of Globalization. Might these regions become hotbeds of significant unrest in the not-too-distant future?

Looking at things from this perspective, it becomes easier to understand the “pressure points” we’re witnessing in the political environment in the United States and Europe.  I didn’t realize the degree to which North America and the Euro Area were “the biggest losers” over the past quarter century.  Seeing it spelled out like this, perhaps we can have a little more empathy for the people who feel dissatisfied and who are looking for change.

How easily that change can occur — and whether it will turn out to be a net benefit — well, those are entirely different questions!

__________________

In brief, the methodology behind the analysis is as follows:

1.       Data source is the World Bank World Development Indicators database, last updated 19th July 2016.

2.       Raw data is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita per year, in constant International Dollars, adjusted for purchase price parity (PPP). Use of constant International Dollars strips out the effects of inflation or deflation. The PPP adjustment accounts for differences in the cost of living within each region; GDP is adjusted down for regions having higher-than-average living costs, while GDP is adjusted up for regions having lower-than-average living costs.  

3.       The index for each region and year is calculated as the regional GDP at PPP, divided by worldwide GDP at PPP.

4.       The graph pictured above depicts the natural logarithms of the calculated indexes for each region and year. Hence worldwide GDP at PPP is zero (0); GDP at PPP values lower than the worldwide average are negative, while GDP at PPP values higher than worldwide average are positive.  

 

The States Where Your Dollar Goes a Good Deal Further

billsPeople have long suspected that many of America’s “richest” areas, based on salaries and other income, also happen to be where the cost of living is significantly higher.

Silicon Valley plus the New York City, Boston and the DC metro areas are some of the obvious regions, notorious for their out-of-sight housing and real estate prices.

But there are other factors at work as well in these high-cost areas, such as the cost of delivering goods to certain areas well-removed from the nation’s major trunk transportation arteries (think Alaska, Hawaii, Washington State and Minnesota).

And then there are state and local taxes. There appears to be a direct relationship between higher costs of living and higher taxation, too.

It’s one thing to go on hunches. But helpfully, all of these perceptions have been confirmed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, using Personal Consumption Expenditure and American Community Survey data to do so.  Rolling the data up, the BEA has published comparative figures for all 50 states plus DC pertaining to the relative cost of living.

The approach was simple: consolidate the data to come up with a dollar figure in each state that represents how much $100 can purchase locally compared to the national average.  To get there, average price levels in each state have been calculated for household consumption, including rental housing costs.

Based on 2014 data, the figures have been mapped and are shown below:

100

So, just how far does $100 go?

The answer to that question is this: quite a bit further if you live in the mid-Continent region of the country compared to the Pacific Coast or the Northeast U.S.

In fact, $100 will get you upwards of 15% more goods and services in quite a few states. Here are the Top 10 states how much $100 will actually buy there:

  • Mississippi: $115.74 worth of goods and services
  • Arkansas: $114.16
  • Alabama: $113.51
  • Missouri: $113.51
  • South Dakota: $113.38
  • West Virginia: $112.87
  • Ohio: $112.11
  • Iowa: $111.73
  • Kansas: $111.23
  • Oklahoma: $111.23

At the other end of the scale, $100 is only going to buy about 20% to 30% fewer goods and services in the “Bottom 10” states compared to the “Top 10.” Here’s how it looks state-by-state:

  • DC: $84.60
  • Hawaii: $85.32
  • New York: $86.66
  • New Jersey: $87.64
  • California: $88.57
  • Maryland: $89.85
  • Connecticut: $91.41
  • Massachusetts: $93.28
  • Alaska: $93.37
  • New Hampshire: $94.16

Which states are closest to the $100 reference figure? Those would be Illinois at $99.40, and Oregon at $101.21.

I must say that those last two figures surprised me a bit … as I would have expected $100 to go less far in Illinois and Oregon.

Which of the state results surprise you? If any of them do, please share your observations with other readers.

The Sanders/Trump phenomenon: A view from outside the United States.

photo1This past Tuesday evening as I watched Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump vanquish their rivals handily in the New Hampshire presidential primary election, I received an e-mail from my brother, Nelson Nones, with his observations on “what it all means.”

As someone who has lived and worked outside the United States for years, Nelson’s views are often quite perceptive — perhaps because he is able to look at things from afar and can see the “landscape” better than those of us who are much closer to the action.

Call it a “forest versus trees” perspective.

And when it comes to the 2016 presidential election, it is Nelson’s view that the Sanders/Trump phenomenon is absolutely real and not something based on personality or celebrity — for good or for ill.

Shown below is what Nelson wrote to me.

… On the Underlying Dynamics

For context into what’s happening in the United States, the Pew Research Center’s recent report on the wealth gap in the United States is instructive.

In a nutshell, over the past 30 years Pew’s data points reveal: 

  • Upper-income families currently represent ~20% of the total, and their wealth (measured by median net worth) has doubled. 
  • Middle-income families represent 46% of the total. Their wealth barely changed (up 2%). 
  • Lower-income families therefore represent ~34% of the total, but their wealth fell 18%.

Now, after the end of the Cold War in 1992 until the onset of the Great Recession in 2007, the wealth of all three groups did rise, albeit by varying degrees: 

  • Upper-income by 112%
  • Middle-income by 68%
  • Lower-income by 30%

Here’s how they fared during the Great Recession (2007-10): 

  • Upper-income wealth declined by 17%
  • Middle-income wealth fell by 39%
  • Lower-income wealth fell by 42%

And after the Great Recession:

  • Upper-income families recovered 36% of their wealth lost during the Great Recession
  • Middle-income families recovered none
  • Lower-income families lost an additional 7% relative to their wealth in 2007

So, if we assume wealth to be a proxy for the feeling of well-being, then one could surmise that ~80% of American families feel like victims today — of which nearly half feel they are still being victimized.  

… On “Anger”

Are people feeling angry about this? You bet.   

Who are they going to blame? The other ~20% and foreigners, of course. 

Never mind the exculpatory hard data proffered by defenders of the nation’s elites revealing that big banks paid back all the bailout money they received during the Great Recession, or that bankers cannot be jailed for their alleged misdeeds unless and until proven guilty by jurors in courts of law (like anyone else), or that pharmaceutical companies’ margins on $45 billion of profit, at 12%, aren’t “quite” as obscene as they appear at first glance.   

None of those facts can ever restore wealth that’s been lost and never recovered, or is still falling. When you feel like a victim, such hard data are utterly and completely irrelevant.  

Both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump are tapping into this anger with great success. As I watched both Sanders’s and Trump’s victory speeches, to vastly oversimplify, here is what I heard.  Sanders essentially said:

“It’s not fair that most Americans can’t get ahead or are falling behind. I’ll expropriate money from the rich by taxing Wall Street bankers and give it to you in the form of free tuition, student debt restructuring, lower healthcare costs and single-payer healthcare!” 

Trump essentially said:

“Political hacks are negotiating bad deals, letting China, Japan and Mexico take our money away from us every day. As the world’s greatest businessman, I’ll negotiate great deals fast to give you universal healthcare, and beat these countries so you get your money back – without having to share it with all those illegal immigrants!”

Photo2In my view, what both Sanders and Trump recognize is that ~80% of American families may have lost 40% of their wealth since 2007 with little or no hope of recovering it … but they haven’t lost any of their voting power.  

It makes no difference that the prescriptions offered by Sanders and Trump – squeezing money from Wall Street, China, Japan and Mexico, for example – are nonsense. As a lawyer I once knew always said, “Winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing.”  To have any chance of accomplishing something useful (or not) as President, you have to win first.   

… On Populism being the Winning Ticket

In this election, under present circumstances, populism is a sure winner. 

The wealthiest ~20% of families (Democrats as well as Republicans) who represent the “establishment” in the eyes of the angry Sanders and Trump crowds, don’t quite smell the coffee yet.  

The angry crowds are out for money this election cycle, and I believe they hold enough votes to elect one of the two populist candidates (Sanders or Trump) who is promising “money.”   

… Not “experience,” “pragmatism,” “conservativism,” “liberalism,” “socialism,” “limited government,” “feminism,” “pro-life,” “pro-choice,” “pro-LGBT,” “hope,” “change,” or whatever.  But money.

To protect as much of their wealth and status as they can, the elites have little choice but to scuttle their aspirational platitudes and learn to deal with it.

So there you have it — a view of the presidential election from the outside looking in. I think there’s food for thought here — and very possibly a look at where we’ll be in another nine months.

What do other readers think? Agree or disagree?  Please share your observations here.