Beyond brand loyalty: Where “daily relevance” now matters.

In recent times, the Harvard Business Review has reported on a so-called “new era” that is emerging in marketing.  In an HBR article co-authored by Joshua Bellin, Robert Wollan and John Zealley, three marketing science specialists at Accenture, the notion of marketing as a set of sequential trends that overtake and supersede one another is covered.

What are those sequential trends? The HBR article outlines five of them and dubs them “eras,” each of them evolving with increasing rapidity:

  • Mass marketing (up through the 1970s) – The era of mass production, scale and distribution.
  • Marketing segmentation (1980s) – More sophisticated research enabling marketers to target customers in niche segments.
  • Customer-level marketing (1990s and 2000s) – Advances in enterprise IT make it possible to target individuals and aim to maximize customer lifetime value.
  • Loyalty marketing (2010s) – The era of CRM, tailored incentives and advanced customer retention.
  • Relevance marketing (emerging) – Mass communication to the previously unattainable “Segment of One.”

Clearly, it’s technology that has been the catalyst for change as we migrate from one era to the next. Mass marketing was a staple for the better part of 40 years, what with radio/TV and newspaper advertising being paramount.  But subsequent eras have come along much more quickly as we’ve moved from market segmentation to customer-level marketing and loyalty marketing.

As for the emerging era of “relevance marketing,” new techniques are enabling marketers to exploit explicit data by name (such as previous purchase history and other known information) along with implicit data (additional information that can be inferred by behavior).

The question is whether this kind of “relevance” will engender long-term wins with today’s customers. The same technology that enables advertisers to target “Segments of One” is what enables those very targets to weigh the worth of those messages, discounts and offers so that they can find the best “deal” for themselves in their exact moment of need.

As far as the customer is concerned, wholesale digitization means that last week’s “preferred vendor” could be next week’s “reject” — with “loyalty” standing at the wayside holding the bag.

The danger is that for the seller, it can rapidly become a “race to the bottom” as buyers’ spontaneity erodes profit margins while the brand goodwill dissipates as quickly as it was created.

Marketing thought leaders Jim Lecinski, Gord Hotchkiss and several others have referred to this as the “zero moment of truth” – and in this case the “zero” may also be referring to the seller’s profit margin after we’ve progressed through the five eras of marketing that bring us to the “Segment of One.”

What are your thoughts about where marketing is ending up now that technology has given companies the power to micro-target — particularly if it means profit margins declining to their own “micro” levels? Please share your thoughts with other readers.

The Limits of Delivering “Cheaper Value”

Nano vehicle

Tata Nano car on fire
Tata Nano ... Tata "No-No"?
About a year ago, the international press was abuzz about the latest new “value” entry in the automobile business. Amid great fanfare, Tata Motors, part of India’s largest corporate conglomerate, was introducing the “Nano,” a car designed to appeal to India’s mass market.

The Nano, which can seat five people and has a surprisingly roomy interior for its size, carries a base price of only ~$2,200 — lower than any other car in the world — which proved irresistible to families of modest means whose finances had required that they make do with motorcycles or scooters before.

Some 9,000 Nano vehicles were delivered in July, but since then, sales have slowed dramatically – to just around 500 shipments to dealers in November.

How did Nano’s star fall so far, so fast – especially for a vehicle which Tata Motors thought was impressive enough that it planned to introduce it in other developing markets … then Europe … and finally to the United States?

Production delays have something to do with it. But the real problem is the performance of the car. Most alarming are reports that the vehicle can catch on fire, with one widely broadcast incident where a Nano caught on fire and was engulfed by flames on the way home from the auto showroom!

In response, Tata, while denying anything is wrong with the design of the Nano and studiously avoiding any language of “recall,” is offering to retrofit the automobile with extra safety features. It’s also extending the warranty on the car from 18 months to a solid four years.

Will these moves change the impression that the car is more of a “No-No” rather than a “Nano” and move its sales trajectory back into positive territory? Perhaps. But it’s interesting to note that sales of a rival “value” car made by Suzuki – the “Alto” – have now overtaken those of the Nano. The Alto carries a higher base price of $6,200, and yet it posted unit sales of ~30,000 in November, making it India’s best-selling car that month.

[The success of the Suzuki Alto in India is nice news for a company whose cars in the U.S. have been on a downward plunge all this year – with sales off ~42% in 2010 compared to 2009.]

The experience of the Nano and the Alto in India brings up an interesting question: Is it possible to make small, cheap version of products that are significant purchase items and win the confidence of a broad customer base?

To a degree, yes. But there are limits to “how low you can go” in value-engineering a product for performance and safety, below which customers just turn and walk away. (Or, in this case, drive away.)

Moreover, just like the experience of the Yugo or the Trabant, there’s a risk of forming a poor market image that’s impossible to shake off.

And in this particular case, the brand names don’t help at all. It’s just too easy for disgusted consumers to say “Ta-Ta” to Tata Motors and “No-No” to the Nano.